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Introduction
In our everyday life we consume a number of goods that all bring us utility. For most of them, that is all. For some, today's consumption can have some e¤ects on tomorrow's health. For example, smoking leads to shorter lives or excess sugar to diabetes. To the extent that we impose costs on ourselves, there is no need for government action except if out of ignorance or myopia we do not take into account the delayed damage done to our health. 1 If this is the case, then there is a "paternalistic"mandate for public action, assuming that the government has a correct perception of the health damage generated by our sinful consumption.
Optimal sin taxes have been studied by O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) . They model an economy where individuals have hyperbolic preferences and di¤er in both their taste for the sin good and in their degree of time-inconsistency. They show how (heterogeneity in) time inconsistency a¤ects the optimal (Ramsey) consumption tax policy. Their main insight is that, "although taxes create consumption distortion for fully self-controlled people, such distortions are second-order relative to the bene…ts from reducing over-consumption by people with self-control problems" (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 2006, p. 1827). Gruber and Koszegi (2001) study a Pigouvian tax used to counteract over-consumption due to self-control problems, and apply their model to the determination of optimal cigarette taxes. Gruber and Koszegi (2004) also study cigarette taxation with self-control problems, but their focus is the tax incidence for di¤erent income groups rather than optimal taxes. O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) are representative of the literature studying present-biased preferences (such as Laibson (1997) ) in that 1) they assume that all non-biased individuals disapprove or regret their past consumption decisions and 2) there is nothing that agents can do to mitigate the current impact of past consumption decisions. Our objective in this paper is to lift those two assumptions and study their consequences on optimal sin taxes.
We model a two-period situation where individuals consume a sin good, with positive 1 immediate grati…cation but negative impact on second stage health status. In the second stage, individuals may invest in health care services that have a positive impact on their health status. Individuals di¤er in income and in how much they take into account the link between sin good consumption and health care on the one hand, and health status on the other hand.
We contrast two possibilities. In the …rst one, individuals realize in the second period the mistake they did previously, regret their past high sin good consumption, and invest in health care understanding its correct impact on their health and utility.
In other words, individuals su¤er from myopia in the …rst period, but use their true or correct preferences later on. They thus exhibit "dual selves", using a term coined in the behavioral literature. A second possibility is that these individuals never take into account the true impact of sin good consumption and health expenditures on health status. They thus act upon the same (mistaken) preferences in the two periods of their lives. Up to their last days, these people stay ignorant of (or unwilling to act upon) these e¤ects.
Which preferences should the social planner use when assessing optimal taxes/subsidies on sin good consumption, saving and health care expenditures? The recent literature on paternalism has studied the impact of the introduction of behavioral considerations on the objective of the planner. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) make a strong case for "libertarian paternalism", which applies to settings in which no coercion is involved, such as when the planner has to choose the default option (such as the automatic enrollment in 401(k) employee savings plans in the US). Other papers go further and study situations where the planner's decision coerces people, such as when it taxes certain goods or even prevents them from being consumed. The literature has focused upon the case where people di¤er in their degree of non-rationality. These contributions advocate the use by the planner of "cautious" (O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999)) or "asymmetric" (Camerer et al. (2003) ) paternalism, which trades-o¤ the bene…ts of paternalistic interventions for people making mistakes against the costs for fully rational individuals. This literature usually shows that some intervention is called for by this kind of paternalism, since deviations from laissez-faire impose second-order costs on rational individuals, but …rst-order gains for non-rational people. Moreover, they show (O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) ) that even a small probability (or proportion) of people making mistakes can have dramatic e¤ects for optimal policy. We add to this literature by departing from it in two ways. First, we study the consequences of adopting a paternalistic objective when individuals are adamant in the mistakes they make -i.e., when they never realize (because for instance of ignorance or cognitive dissonance) that they base their decisions on wrong premises. Second, rather than mixing rational and non-rational individuals, we contrast the results obtained when all individuals are repentant in the second period or when none is (in the two cases, we allow for heterogeneity in the degree of myopia, but not for whether myopia persists or not in the second stage). Obviously, paternalism is easier to defend in our setting when individuals have dual selves. We nevertheless think that a case can be made in favor of paternalism even when individuals never realize their mistake and thus always use preferences di¤erent from those used by the planner. Our approach in that case is reminiscent of the older literature on "merit goods" (Musgrave (1959) , more recently Besley (1988)), where we add that the reason for the di¤erence between the planner's and the individuals'preferences resides in the (unrecognized) mistakes made by individuals. We consider it interesting to study and contrast the results obtained in the two scenarios even if the argument for paternalism is less convincing in the latter one. 2 We obtain the following results. We …rst show that the …rst best outcome can be decentralized with individualized linear taxes and subsidies in the two scenarios (persistent error and dual self). In the …rst one, it is necessary to tax the sin good consumption while subsidizing health care expenditures. There is no need to in ‡uence saving. The second scenario is more complex, since the social planner faces a problem with changing preferences. The planner has to intervene in the …rst period by taxing the sin good while subsidizing savings. There is no need to in ‡uence health care expenditures, which are optimally chosen provided that …rst period choices are optimal. Comparing the sin tax in the two scenarios, we obtain that it is smaller in the dual self case if and only if the marginal e¤ect of health care on health status increases with sin good consumption.
We then turn to the second best setting where the planner observes neither income, preferences nor savings. In the single self case, optimal linear sin taxes and health expenditure subsidies depend upon two terms: a (classical) covariance term re ‡ecting distributive considerations and a "Pigouvian" term that re ‡ects the "internalities" an individual imposes on himself. In the dual self case, optimal tax formulas contain a third term, which is linked to the inability to control savings. This additional term calls for higher tax on sin good/subsidies on health care provided that this tax/subsidy encourages savings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model, the …rst-best solutions and the decentralization conditions are presented for the two speci…cations.
Then in section 3 we turn to the second-best problem when individuals persist in their ignorance. In section 4, we study the alternative second-best problem, that is when individuals realize having made a mistake. A …nal section concludes.
2 First-best and decentralization
Model
We consider a society consisting of a number of types of individuals i. Each type is characterized by a wealth endowment w i and a subjective and objective health parameter i and i . Each individual's life spans over two periods. In the …rst one, he consumes a numeraire good c i and a sin good x i . He also saves s i for future expenses.
In the second period, he consumes an amount d i of the numeraire and he invests e i in health improvement. In this second period, he enjoys a quality of health i h (x i ; e i ), on which x i has a negative e¤ect and e i a positive e¤ect. For reason of ignorance or myopia, the individual has a perception of this function that underestimates the impact of both arguments. In other words, he perceives a health function equal to i h (x i ; e i )
His two-period utility function can be written as:
with budget constraints:
where ; ; are tax rates and a is a demogrant. For simplicity reasons, we assume a zero time discount rate and a zero rate of interest.
First-best
We assume that the government is a paternalistic utilitarian. In other words, it adopts an objective made of the sum of utilities (1) in which i replaces i : As a benchmark, we derive the …rst-best (FB) conditions by solving the following Lagrangian:
where is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource constraints and n i the relative number of type i's individuals. The FOCs yield:
with h x < 0 and h e > 0: Denote the …rst best solution by c i ; x i ; d i and e i . We can also de…ne s i = d i + e i , the (implicit) individual savings at the …rst-best solution.
The utilitarian planner equalizes marginal utility of consuming the numeraire good in both periods. Since preferences for this good are the same for all individuals, this calls for c i and d i to be equal and the same for all. Marginal utility for numeraire and sin goods are also equalized, with the latter composed of the immediate marginal grati…cation and of the (true) delayed marginal impact on health. Finally, the planner also equalizes second period marginal utility from consuming the sin good and from 5 consuming health care. If the marginal impact of sin good consumption on health is the same for all individuals ( i = ), then x i and e i are also identical for all.
It is interesting to contrast these conditions with the laissez-faire (LF) ones, which are obtained by maximizing:
In the LF, = = = a i = 0 and we have:
Marginal utility of consuming the numeraire and the sin goods are also equalized (though they di¤er across agents if there is heterogeneity in i ), but not at the correct level since individuals make a mistake when assessing the impact of both sin good and health care consumption on their second period utility (health status).
Decentralization with persisting errors
To decentralize the above optimum, we need individualized redistributive lump sum taxes a i and individualized corrective taxes or subsidies on the sin good and health expenditure.
The tax on sin good consumption forces the individual to internalize the full impact of his sin good consumption on his health. It is proportional to the share of the impact that he does not spontaneously internalize (given by the di¤erence between and ), to the marginal impact of sin good on health, and decreases with the marginal impact of health care on health status. It is also necessary to subsidize health care, since individuals underestimate its impact on health. Intuitively, the subsidy rate is equal to the percentage of underestimation by the individual ( )= . There is no need to in ‡uence saving, since individuals do not exhibit time-inconsistent preferences.
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Those taxes and subsidies are individualized. Naturally, with i = and i = , they would be identical for all.
Decentralization with dual self
Up to now we have assumed that individuals stick to their beliefs in the second period.
Let us now make the reasonable assumption that in the second period they realize that they have made a mistake out of ignorance or myopia and will accordingly modify their decision concerning health care. In behavioral economics, one then speaks of dual self.
When the "reasonable" self prevails in the second period, the choice of e i is determined by the equality
On the other hand, this level of e is not the one that the individual envisioned when he chose his sin good consumption and saving in the …rst period. Rather, the amount of health care that the individual planned to buy later on, denoted by e P i , is given by
The choice of x i and s i then satis…es the following …rst-order conditions:
Is it possible to decentralize the …rst-best optimum in these conditions with our linear instruments that are chosen in the …rst period? In fact, this is possible using i and i plus a i . With these instruments, and denoting optimal values with a , one obtains x i and s i , which then imply e i . De…ning e P i as the planned level of e i when the tax instruments are set to decentralize the …rst-best, we obtain that
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Equation (4) shows that the individual will take the optimal health care decision in the second stage, provided that he chose the optimal values of x and s in the …rst stage.
In ‡uencing health care decision is then unnecessary, provided that tax instruments on saving and sin good consumption decentralize these two optimal choices. The sin tax is proportional to the mistake made by the individual. This mistake comes from two sources: under-estimation of the impact of sin good on health (since < ) and
misplanning of the future amount of health care consumed (e P i v e i ). Since individuals misplan their future health care need, it is also necessary to in ‡uence their saving decision, as shown by (6) . Note that assuming i = and i = , we obtain i = and i = : In words, a i makes everyone identical and the Pigouvian tax and subsidy rates are identical.
To illustrate this point, assume a single individual with = 0 < = 1: We then have e P i = 0 so that the implementing tax rates or subsidy are
Comparison of sin taxes in the two speci…cations
It is interesting to compare the sin taxes obtained under the two speci…cations. To make the comparison easier, we assume that i = > 0 and i = . We thus have (with S for single self and D for dual self):
In the two cases, the sin tax is proportional to the error made in the …rst stage when evaluating the damage of sin good consumption on health, measured at the optimal sin good and health care consumptions. An additional term is present in the dual self case, which is proportional to the second mistake made by the individual in that case. Since this individual misestimates how much health care he will buy at the optimum, he is also mistaken in his assessment of the marginal damage done by the optimal amount of sin good consumption, as measured by the function h(x; e). The sign of this impact depends on the cross-derivative of this function. Assume for instance that it is positive. Since the individual under-estimates how much health care he will buy, he then over-estimates how bad the marginal impact of sin good will be (as measured by the function h(:)).
This calls for decreasing the tax on sin good, compared to a "single self" individual.
Assuming that h xe has everywhere the same sign, we then obtain that S T D if and only if h xe T 0:
The sign of this cross derivative depends upon the kind of sin good we are considering. For instance, it seems reasonable to assume that it is positive if the sin good is sugar: the more you eat, the more medications designed to treat diabetes may be helpful to you. With this assumption the sin tax is smaller when the individual acknowledges his mistake in the second period of his life. The opposite assumption can be make for smoking: heavy smokers increase their probability of getting lung cancer, for which there is up to now no e¢ cient cure in the majority of cases. Put bluntly, there is not much utility that you can get from consuming health care if you end up with lung cancer following heavy smoking...
Second-best in the case of persistent errors
We now turn to the second-best setting with linear tax instruments and uniform demogrant. We assume in the remaining of this paper that i = > i : In other words, the objective e¤ect of both e and x on health is the same for all, but individuals vary in their degree of myopia (as well as in income). We also assume that taxes/subsidies on saving are not available anymore (either because saving is not observable, or because elements not modelled, like international mobility of capital, prevent saving from being taxed or subsidized).
We …rst consider the case when the individuals never acknowledge that the true health parameter is . In that case, restricting the instruments to linear taxes and 9 uniform demogrant we write the new Lagrangian as:
where s i , x i and e i are functions of a, , and and are obtained from the following optimal conditions for individual choices:
u 0 (d) (1 + ) + h e (x; e) = 0:
Assuming interior solutions, the FOCs of the social problem are given by:
) @x @a + h e (x; e) @e @a ( ) E 1 @s @a @x @a @e @a = 0;
In these expressions, we have used the operator E for P n i .
In compensated terms, these expressions can be written as: 4
It is important to note that we here use the concept of average compensation and not that of the standard Slutsky term. Using a tilde for the former, a hat for the latter,
we have:
and similarly, @x @ = @x @ + @x @a (Ex x) :
In Appendix A we provide the FOC's in term of the standard Slutsky e¤ects. Our approach is simple, but the signs of the compensated terms have to be interpreted with caution. For example, we know that @x=@ < 0, but if x is much smaller than the average, Ex, @x=@ could be positive.
In interpreting the above FOCs, we assume that these compensated derivative are negative. We also observe that with either identical individuals or individualized lump sum transfers a i , the …rst-best optimum is obtained with just and . As mentioned 4 De…ning @L2 @ = @L2 @ + @L2 @a Es;
@L2 @ = @L2 @ + @L2 @a Ex;
@L2 @ = @L2 @ + @L2 @a Ee:
at the beginning of the section, we assume that taxation/subsidization of saving is not available to the planner, so that = 0. With this assumption, we have
If we assume that the cross derivatives are negligible, namely that @x=@ ! 0 and @ẽ=@ ! 0, we obtain:
where > 0:
The …rst term of the numerator of (12) and (13) is the Pigouvian term found in (2) and (3) . With di¤erent individuals and no correlation between i and w i , the covariance will be negative in both equations, since richer people consume more of all goods (x, c and e) than poorer people with the same degree of myopia. This tends to increase the tax on sin goods and decrease the subsidy on health care, compared to the case with identical individuals. With a positive correlation, cov(u 0 (c) ; x) will tend to increase (since less myopic people, those with a larger , consume less sin good) which leads to a smaller sin tax than with zero correlation. The impact of a positive correlation on cov(u 0 (c) ; e) is less clear: smarter people buy less sin good, but they also better realize the importance of health care, so that the net impact on the amount of e consumed is not easy to determine.
Second-best with dual self
Now we assume that the individuals realize after one period that they made a mistake and that the only corrective decision they can make is the choice of health expenditure.
As in section 2.4, we thus distinguish between the planned investment e P and the ex post choice e. The indirect utility function used by the social planner in its welfare maximization has to take into account these two values of e which yield two values of d.
In the …rst period, the functions x ( ; ; ; a), s ( ; ; ; a) and e P ( ; ; ; a) are obtained as the solution to: In the second period we have the e¤ective demand for e de…ned by (4) e = f s; x; e P = e ( ; ; ; a) :
The Lagrangian is given by:
which is similar to L 2 except that individual choices are now determined by (14), (15) and (17). The FOCs are given by
x; e P @x @a E 1 @s @a @x @a @e @a = 0;
x; e P @x @ + E e + @s @ + @x @ + @e @ = 0:
As in the previous section, we assume = 0 and use @L 3 =@a to obtain the compensated expressions of @L 3 =@ and @L 3 =@ :
It is clear from the above that even with identical individuals, one cannot achieve the …rst-best with and as instruments. Solving for and , we obtain
= h x (x; e) h x x; e P and = E @x @ E @ẽ @ E @ẽ @ E @x @ :
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These can be rewritten as follows if we assume that the cross price e¤ects are negligible:
The covariance terms in both equations are identical to those in the single self scenario and re ‡ect the equity concern of public policy. The third term of the numerator of (18) is the Pigouvian term found in equation (7) = u 0 d P u 0 (d) @s @ @ẽ @ :
The second part of the sin tax is the familiar Pigouvian term, expressed as in the …rstbest decentralization equation (8) . The other term in both equations comes from our inability to control saving directly, which would be necessary to decentralize the …rstbest optimum. Saving can be indirectly controlled through the use of both and . If any of these instruments stimulate saving, this makes using it more desirable.
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the case of sin goods that have delayed negative e¤ects that individuals ignore at the time of consumption but acknowledge later. Individuals have then the possibility of partially compensating those negative e¤ects by investing in health care. Assuming a paternalistic government, we show that the …rst-best could be decentralized with a sin tax, a subsidy on saving and individualized lump sum transfers (or alternatively, by assuming identical individuals). In the second-best, individualized lump sum transfers are not available and the only available instruments are a linear sin tax and a linear subsidy on health care. We discuss the optimal second-best tax subsidy policy wherein distributive and corrective Pigouvian considerations are mixed.
We also consider the case of what we call persistent error, namely the case where individuals acknowledge the negative e¤ects of their sinful consumption when it is too late to take any corrective action (i.e., after e i has been chosen). From an individuals perspective this latter case is formally equivalent to yet another setting which corresponds to what can be called persisting ignorance, where the individual never acknowledges the negative e¤ects of his consumption. However, under this interpretation, the use of a paternalistic approach become questionable; we return to the traditional, "old" paternalism. One could thus argue that the right approach is welfarist and not paternalist in that setting. We present the welfarist solution to the case of persisting ignorance in Appendix B. Comparing this to the results obtain in Section 2.3., we show that with paternalism the planner wants the good of people against their own will not only in the …rst, but also in the second period of their life. With welfarism, we add di¤erent utilities, which is also questionable.
In this paper we have focused on sinful consumption. Our method could be used for other problems. For example, lack of physical exercises or hygiene in the …rst period of life which has delayed detrimental e¤ects. These e¤ects can be partially o¤set in the second period. Another example is overtime or moonlighting that lead to early disability.
A fully rational individual would understand the importance of not abusing one's body when young to avoid regretful consequences later on in lifetime. The ingredients of these various situations are: behavior with delayed detrimental e¤ects, myopia and possibility of partial compensation.
Appendix

A Expressions with standard Slutsky terms
We only consider the case of persistent errors:
The FOCs are given by @L 2 @a = Eu 0 (c) + E h x (x; e) @x @a + h e (x; e) @e @a ( ) E 1 @s @a @x @a @e @a = 0; @L 2 @ = Eu 0 (c) s + E h x (x; e) @x @ + h e (x; e) @e @ ( ) E s @s @ @x @ @e @ = 0; @L 2 @ = Eu 0 (c) x + E h x (x; e) @x @ + h e (x; e) @e @ ( ) E x @s @ @x @ @e @ = 0; @L 2 @ = Eu 0 (d) x + E h x (x; e) @x @ + h e (x; e) @e @ ( ) E e @s @ @x @ @e @ = 0:
Using the compensated terms, we obtain: @L 2 @ = cov u 0 (c) ; x + E @ŝ @ + @x @ + @ê @ + ; @L 2 @ = cov u 0 (c) ; e + E @ŝ @ + @x @ + @ê @ + :
where variables with hat (ŝ;x andê) are the standard compensated demands and We …nally get:
= cov (u 0 (c) ; x) E @ê @ cov (u 0 (c) ; e) E @ê @ E @x @ E @ê @ E @ê @ E @x @ + E @ê @ + E @ê @ E @x @ E @ê @ E @ê @ E @x @ ; = cov (u 0 (c) ; e) E @x @ cov (u 0 (c) ; x) E @x @ E @x @ E @ê @ E @ê @ E @x @ + E @x @ + E @x @ E @x @ E @ê @ E @ê @ E @x @ :
In the case of negligible cross price e¤ects the optimal tax are given by To achieve such an optimum, one does not need any Pigouvian instrument. Lump sum individualized transfers su¢ ce. The redistribution goes for sure from high income to low income agents. As to the other characteristic i it is not clear whether the more myopic bene…t from redistribution. Individuals with low i tend to consume more x i but less e i than individuals with high i . Without further assumption, it is di¢ cult to know the direction of redistribution.
As an example, assume two types with identical income, 1 = 0 and 2 = = 1:
Further, we take h (x; e) = h e x 2 =2 :
In the laissez-faire, u 0 (c 1 ) = u 0 (d 1 ) = ' 0 (x 1 ) ; e 1 = 0: u 0 (c 2 ) = u 0 (d 2 ) = ' 0 (x 2 ) h 0 e 2 x 2 2 =2 x 2 = h 0 e 2 x 2 2 =2 :
If is very small, type 2 will bene…t from redistribution; if is high (strong sin e¤ect), type 1 will bene…t from redistribution.
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